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Ban, Boom, and Echo! 
Entrepreneurship and Initial Coin Offerings 
 
ABSTRACT 
Regulatory spillovers occur when regulation in one country affects either the expected regulatory 
approach and/or entrepreneurial finance markets in other countries. Drawing on institutional 
theory, we investigate the global implications of a regulatory spillover on entrepreneurship. We 
argue that regulatory spillovers have both short- and long-term effects on the number and quality 
of entrepreneurial finance initiatives such as Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). Based on a large-scale 
sample of ICOs in 108 countries, we find that a regulatory ban of ICOs in one country causes a 
short-term increase in the number of low-rated ICOs in other countries and a long-term drop in the 
number of ICOs, especially low-rated, which increases the average ICO rating. That is, a restrictive 
























The traditional context in which the intersection of entrepreneurship and institutional theory 
is examined involves formally defined goods, products, and processes that have boundaries that 
are shaped by country institutions. For example, national laws have been shown to shape 
entrepreneurship and venture capital (Da Gbadji et al., 2015). In the evolving modern economy, 
however, many products are designed to mitigate the influence of country regulatory institutions. 
In some cases, products are even designed to operate globally and decentralized (Hsieh et al., 2018). 
The most notable example of such a product is an Initial Coin Offering (ICO). With the 
development of innovative entrepreneurial financing practices such as ICOs, an important question 
in entrepreneurship theory and practice arises as to whether country regulatory institutions still 
matter in this context, and if so, how?  
In an ICO, “new ventures raise capital by selling tokens to a crowd of investors. Often, this 
token is a cryptocurrency, a digital medium of value exchange based on the distributed ledger 
technology” (Fisch, 2019: 1). With the first ICO (i.e., Mastercoin) occurring in July 2013, ICOs 
represent a recent entrepreneurial finance practice. Moreover, ICOs represent a global 
phenomenon, but they are adopted unevenly across countries (Huang et al., 2019). The 
development of the ICO market has been very volatile, with some 7 billion USD raised in 2017, 
19.7 billion in 2018 and 4.1 billion from January to October 2019.1 Governments around the world 
have been trying to decide on how to react to the emerging ICO market and the opportunities and 
threats involved. This context provides a “laboratory” to increase our understanding of how 
                                                 
1 While these statistics indicate a significant decline of the ICO market in 2019 (10 months), at 4.1bn this still represents 
a non-trivial market, equivalent to about half of the European and UK venture capital market (Invest Europe, 2019). 




changes in country regulatory institutions influence the development of innovative entrepreneurial 
finance markets, which is a fundamental question in entrepreneurship.  
In this paper, we tackle this topic by asking the following question: How does a regulatory 
ban in specific countries (i.e., the China/South Korea ICO ban) influence the number and quality 
of ICOs in other countries over time? The common perspective taken, in extant entrepreneurship 
literature that draws on institutional theory, is that through coercive pressures (i.e., regulations and 
enforcement) governments can affect the depth and breadth of their own countries’ entrepreneurial 
finance markets and entrepreneurship quantity and quality. In this paper, we depart from this focus 
and present an institutional theory of regulatory spillovers that explains how changing regulatory 
institutions, in a specific set of countries, may influence new entrepreneurial finance markets in 
other countries. 
In our multivariate regressions, we use quarterly data on the number of ICOs and ICO 
quality ratings for up to 108 countries from Q3 2015 to Q3 2019. We find that the China/South 
Korea ICO ban initially made entrepreneurs rush to the ICO market in other countries. This rush 
was especially driven by lower-rated ICO projects. We do not find evidence that this rush had an 
immediate impact on the ICO volume fundraised, suggesting that ICO investors did not chase the 
increased offerings. After this initial rush, the ICO market cooled down, with a decreasing long-
term trend in the number of ICOs and volumes raised. Interestingly, after the China/South Korea 
ICO ban, in the longer term, the number of low-rated ICOs declined significantly, while the number 
of high-rated ICOs remained remarkably robust in a generally declining market. Accordingly, the 
average ICO rating increased over time. Taken together, the China/South Korea ban caused an 




Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, understanding the emergence 
of innovative sources of entrepreneurial finance, such as ICOs, is a premier topic in entrepreneurial 
finance (Chen and Bellavitis, 2020; Block et al., 2018; Fisch, 2019; Fisch et al., 2019). We 
contribute to a growing academic literature on ICOs. Several studies have focused on the success 
factors that foster ICO fundraising (Adhami, Giudici and Martinazzi, 2018; Fisch, 2019; Momtaz, 
2020). Studies have also started to examine the motivations to invest in ICOs (Fisch et al., 2019), 
investor behavior in ICOs (Boreiko and Risteski, 2020), and the motivations of entrepreneurs to 
resort to ICOs (Schückes and Gutmann, 2020). Others have investigated market cycles and the link 
between ICOs, Bitcoin, and Ethereum (Masiak et al., 2019) and the link between ICOs and venture 
capital (Fisch and Momtaz, 2019). Probably the closest related to our work is the paper by Huang 
et al. (2019), who examine the geography of ICOs (i.e., a static snapshot of ICOs in different 
countries), but our focus is on the evolution of ICOs over time; thereby, we provide a more dynamic 
picture. Moreover, Huang et al. (2019) show the importance of factor markets (e.g., the 
development of venture capital and crowdfunding markets) on the geography of ICOs, while our 
focus is on the impact of changing regulatory institutions (the “formal rules of the game”; 
Williamson, 2000: 597) in specific countries on the global ICO market.  
Second, more broadly, we contribute to a limited, but growing, stream of research that 
connects entrepreneurship with institutional theory (Bruton et al., 2010; Tolbert, David, and Sine, 
2011). Extant entrepreneurship research has studied how country institutions influence the 
founding of new ventures and entrepreneurial growth opportunities in those countries (e.g., Armour 
and Cumming, 2008; Estrin et al., 2013; Stenholm et al., 2013), or how country institutions relate 
to the development of entrepreneurial finance markets, including the size of venture capital markets 
and venture capitalists’ behavior in countries (e.g., Bruton et al., 2005; Groh et al., 2010; Li and 
Zahra, 2012). Still, we lack a deep theoretical and empirical understanding of how changes in 
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country regulatory institutions can influence the development of new entrepreneurial finance 
markets in other countries, a topic we address in this paper.  
This topic is important because the ICO context presents unique challenges to institutional 
theory, which commonly takes regulatory institutions as linked to specific countries (Holmes et al., 
2013). While many ICOs have clear links to specific countries, ICOs can operate globally and in a 
decentralized fashion (Adhami et al., 2018). Accordingly, the impact of country regulatory 
institutions on the adoption of this new entrepreneurial finance practice is often assumed to be 
limited. Indeed, in the context of ICOs, entrepreneurs could technically get around specific country 
regulations by operating globally and decentralized, and could easily relocate to a more friendly 
regulatory environment. As one commentator suggested: “[T]he blockchain or digital currency has 
a very typical global character, resulting in a simple prohibition [in a specific country] having no 
effect in the physical space”.2 The new theory and evidence presented in this paper, however, 
suggests that the exact opposite is true. Changes in country regulatory institutions play a very 
pronounced role in entrepreneurial processes and the adoption of innovative entrepreneurial 
finance practices in other countries. We present new insights into how specific governments can 
strongly influence the development of new entrepreneurial finance markets in other countries, 
through mechanisms other than coercion. Specifically, regulatory spillover effects entail unique 
short-term and long-term effects, and impact not only the quantity but also the quality of ICOs in 
other countries.  
Taken together, our study extends and bounds what we know about the connections 
between institutions and entrepreneurship and spillovers from one country to another, as 
recognized in other work (for a recent review, see Cumming et al., 2017). Our study has important 
                                                 
2 Source: https://bravenewcoin.com/insights/china-ico-ban-proving-ineffective 
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implications for policy-design, and calls for policy integration across the world when approaching 
new entrepreneurial finance markets, such as the ICO market. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we first discuss the institutional theory of regulatory spillovers. Thereafter, 
we introduce the context of ICOs and specific actors (entrepreneurs, investors, and regulators) in 
that market. After explaining the theory and context, we develop our hypotheses. 
Regulatory Spillovers 
Institutional theory is not a unified theory. While some scholars rely on the tools of 
economic theory, others prefer to take a sociological approach (Bruton et al., 2010). Despite these 
different perspectives, there is broad agreement that institutions, including formal regulations, 
matter and heavily influence people’s actions (Williamson, 2000). The general perspective is that 
national governments are powerful actors, who significantly influence the diffusion of practices in 
their countries, generally through coercive pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001). 
In other words, their rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities may foster or hamper the 
diffusion of practices (Scott, 2003). 
Extant entrepreneurship research inspired by institutional theory (Bruton et al., 2010; Scott, 
2001; Williamson, 2000) has focused on how regulation within a country influences the breadth 
and depth of entrepreneurial finance markets in those countries (e.g., Groh et al., 2010; Li and 
Zahra, 2012) or, more broadly, how regulation in countries influences the quantity and quality of 
entrepreneurial finance markets in those countries (e.g., Armour and Cumming, 2008; Estrin et al., 
2013; Stenholm et al., 2013). In this paper, we draw on institutional theory, to examine how 
regulatory actions in specific countries influence a new segment of the entrepreneurial finance 
market (i.e., the ICO market) in other countries.  
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Regulatory spillovers can apply in one of two cases (Goldsmith, 2000). First, a regulatory 
change in one country can inspire a similar regulatory change in another country, or at least a 
change in the actual or expected regulatory approach in another country. For example, in 2006 in 
the United Kingdom, there was a ban on “trailer fees” in the sale of mutual funds. A trailer fee is a 
fee paid from the fund to an advisor at the end of each year as a percentage of the amount of capital 
that an investor has invested with the fund, thereby creating a conflict of interest between the 
advisor and investor. These fees were subsequently banned in Continental Europe in 2007, and in 
Australia in 2010; and over the period 2012-2018 these fees were investigated for a potential ban 
in Canada, as inspired by the bans in other countries (Cumming et al., 2020a). A regulatory 
spillover does not require an exact same type of regulatory change from one country to another 
country. That is to say that just because there was no regulatory ban on mutual fund fees in Canada, 
it does not mean that Canada was immune to regulatory spillover in that context. All that is needed 
is for a change in approach to regulation, and/or change in surveillance and enforcement of related 
regulations or regulatory oversight for there to be a regulatory spillover. 
Second, a regulatory spillover can occur when a regulatory change in one country affects 
the actions of marketplace participants in another country (Goldsmith, 2000). For example, with 
the mutual fund fee ban in a foreign country, it is possible that advisors will act differently in their 
home countries in response. There can be a variety of different reasons for the response, possibly 
due to cross-border activities, and possibly due to future expected regulatory oversight or changes. 
In sum, regulatory spillovers can affect marketplaces through two possible channels. 
Below, we consider the context of ICOs to examine the possible implications of both channels. We 
describe the entrepreneurs in this marketplace and their investors and explain our findings in detail. 




ICO quality may vary broadly. Higher quality ICOs are launched by a team of experienced 
and motivated entrepreneurs who have a clear and useful product, and a viable long-term vision 
and business model to ensure financial stability and success. High-quality ICOs have timely and 
full disclosure to ensure investor confidence. Setting up a high-quality ICO takes resources and 
time to develop the technology and infrastructure.3   
On the other end of the spectrum, a low-quality ICO is launched with limited investments 
in terms of resources and time. The team behind the ICO is usually of lower quality, encompassing 
entrepreneurs with poor experience and limited technical skills. This combination leads to minimal 
investment in technology to mitigate risks of hacks and fraud. The ICO white paper is usually 
incomplete, and with vague disclosure, promoting a business plan that is not well thought out in a 
way that would secure the stability of the ICO.  
The extreme cases of low-quality ICOs include fraud and the funding of illegal activity. For 
example, the Nitro Platform Token ICO, launched from Malta, is an ICO with low quality ratings. 
The ICO received a rating of 1/5 on www.icobench.com.4 At the time of writing, the ICO website 
showed a team of six but no information on their experience was disclosed. An online search did 
not find results associated with the team members’ names and the ICO name, nor do the team 
members appear to have LinkedIn profiles. The product is of a dubious nature. The white paper 
argues that the company intends “to build a business ecosystem that embraces all investors […]. 
Easier than Tetris. You just want to decide when you want to make money. That’s all.” The expert 
reviewer highlights these weaknesses reporting that “this is a scam”, “there is a lack of product” 
and “fake team”.  One recent paper suggests that 76 billion USD (46 %) of detected illegal activity 
                                                 
3 Examples of higher quality ICOs are numerous. Some webpages even provide top 10 lists; see for example 
https://topicolist.com/ 
4 Source: https://icobench.com/ico/nitro-platform-token 
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is financed through cryptocurrencies (Folley et al., 2019). Hornuf et al. (2019) examined a sample 
of 1,393 ICOs that took place worldwide from September 2016 to July 2018. They identified 274 
fraud cases (or about 20% of the sample), including 188 suspected and 175 confirmed fraud cases. 
Overall, while fraud cases are non-negligible, as detailed above, low-rated ICOs also include 
genuine entrepreneurial endeavors. 
ICO Investors 
Most ICO investors are uninformed or unsophisticated. Typical investors are mere 
speculators that do not do any fundamental research, invest very small amounts, and flip their 
investment even before the underlying product is developed (Fahlenbrach and Frattaroli, 2019). 
Fisch et al. (2019) show that next to financial motives, ICO investors may also have technological 
and ideological motives. They further show that some 39% of ICO investors in their sample have 
a professional background in technology. Conversely, the majority of their respondents lacks either 
a professional technology or finance background. Despite the lack of investor sophistication, 
investors largely lack protection in ICO markets (Cumming et al., 2019; Fahlenbrach and Frattaroli, 
2019), as discussed further in the next subsection. 
ICO Regulators 
In the context of ICOs, it is possible to bypass country regulations and prospectus 
requirements that would normally apply to firms that seek to sell securities to the broad public (e.g., 
Adhami et al., 2018). During the period between 2015 and 2019, ICO regulation is at its very 
infancy. Currently, in different countries around the world, even in the U.S., there are ongoing 
debates as to whether or not ICOs are a “security” in a way that their regulation and surveillance 
would fall within the jurisdiction of a securities commission (Cumming et al., 2019). As such, there 
is much regulatory uncertainty surrounding ICOs. Given the international links associated with 
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ICOs, and the fact that ICOs face scant securities regulation oversight, regulators often look 
towards their counterparts in other countries for regulatory solutions (Clements, 2019a, 2019b).  
In the early days of ICOs, some commentators suggested that the ICO market is “a little 
like the Wild West … - anything goes”.5 Unsurprisingly, governments across the world were 
concerned about the risks involved. Accordingly, as the ICO market grew exponentially, 
governments jumped on the bandwagon to take steps in informing the public of the risks involved, 
providing more guidance, and/or regulating ICOs. For instance, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore highlighted that “ICOs are vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing risks”. 
Regulation of crypto markets invariably faces problems that need to be solved. Bancor’s 
ICO, for example, raised in excess of 153 million USD in a mere three hours (Suberg, 2017). 
Bancor offers a crypto exchange platform and is designed to avoid any mediators. Regulatory 
responses, if needed or if implemented, come months if not years later after long processes of 
research and consultation in the case of crypto regulation (Cumming et al., 2019) and most other 
forms of securities’ regulation (Rodrigues, 2017).  
Summary of ICO Market and Key Players 
The ICO market is highly interconnected around the world. ICOs raise funding for global 
and borderless products, running on the back of a digital blockchain. The ICO market is 
characterized by both high- and low-quality ICOs. Entrepreneurs can act very quickly to raise 
millions of dollars in a short period of time with unsophisticated investors, and with a possibly 
delayed regulatory response diverging from one country to another. The characteristics of ICO 
players and the interconnectedness of the ICO market suggest possible regulatory spillovers with 
associated short- and long-term implications.  
                                                 
5 Source : https://www.bbc.com/news/business-41157249 
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Entrepreneurial Implications of ICO Regulatory Spillovers  
The most notable regulatory event affecting ICOs around the world during the period of 
our study happened in September 2017, when the Chinese and South Korean governments 
announced that ICOs were illegal in their countries. The South Korean Financial Services 
Commission’s (FSC) vice-chairman of financial affairs expressed “a serious concern that the recent 
inflow of funds into the nonproductive speculative direction is showing up”.6 The FSC has further 
suggested that ICOs are overly speculative and constitute a “violation of the capital market law”.7 
A committee led by China’s Central Bank “voiced concern that some ICOs are financial scams and 
pyramid schemes”.8  
Based on the institutional setting of ICOs and regulatory spillovers, we conjecture that there 
will be differential short- and long-term spillover effects of the China/South Korea ICO ban on the 
number and quality of ICO offerings in other countries. 
Short-Term Spillover Hypotheses 
As governments were trying to decide on how to react to the growing ICO market and the 
opportunities and threats involved, the China/South Korea ICO ban aggravated the regulatory 
uncertainty in other countries. More specifically, entrepreneurs may anticipate that other countries 
will follow with a ban or, at a minimum, that tighter regulations might be implemented. One 
commentator stated at the time of the China/South Korea ban: “Governments around the world and 
at every level struggle to make sense of what blockchain technology means for their constituents. 
Perhaps these governing bodies will take the Chinese route and outright ban ICOs, and perhaps 
                                                 
6 Source: https://www.nasdaq.com/article/south-koreas-ico-ban-a-reaction-to-serious-concerns-over-cryptocurrency-
investment-practices-cm854236 
7 Source: https://www.coindesk.com/south-korean-regulator-issues-ico-ban/ 
8 Especially with the China ICO ban, commentators were unclear about the actual motivation behind the ban, stating: 
“I don’t know if the shutdown was motivated by a concern for the investors, or if they just want to control the market”. 
As we detail below, the unclear motivation is not fundamentally affecting the logic related to our hypotheses.   
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they will take a more moderate approach and attempt to regulate them”.9 There was a general 
sentiment that after the China/South Korea ban “most countries will finally make up their minds 
about ICO’s and will either ban them or provide a regulatory framework addressing the various 
aspects of their operation”.10 
 We propose that the increased global regulatory uncertainty caused by the China/South 
Korea ICO ban will make entrepreneurs—especially those with existing ICO plans or those that 
were already in the process of developing ICO plans—more likely to rush to the ICO market. While 
common wisdom suggests that regulatory uncertainty makes people delay their actions, an 
increasing body of research has challenged this view. More specifically, managers can cope with 
regulatory uncertainty in multiple ways besides delaying their actions (Marcus et al., 2011). Indeed, 
Aragón-Correa and Sharma (2003) suggest that environmental uncertainty makes firms more likely 
to act “proactively” and take actions to minimize its effects. Hoffmann et al. (2009) illustrate that 
one of the primary motivations why managers do not postpone their actions, despite regulatory 
uncertainty, is to secure competitive resources and benefit from current (favorable) regulation (or 
lack of regulation). For many blockchain-based firms, it will be difficult (or they may be unwilling) 
to mobilize financial resources from alternative sources of funding such as traditional banks or 
venture capital investors (e.g., Schückes and Gutmann, 2020). Consequently, in the period 
immediately after the China/South Korea ICO ban, there were significant pressures for 
entrepreneurs that were already in the process of planning an ICO to rush to the ICO market to 
avoid potential future regulatory hurdles in countries other than China and South Korea. 







In addition, governments were not only regulating the market, but they were also warning 
investors of the risks involved in ICOs. As previously mentioned, China’s Central Bank warned 
that ICOs could be “scams” and “pyramid schemes”. China was not alone in warning investors. 
Therefore, entrepreneurs’ expectations of a possible decrease in the number of ICO investors, ICO 
investor interest, or additional scrutiny by ICO investors directly after the China/South Korea ICO 
ban may push entrepreneurs to rush to the ICO market to capture the available ICO funding before 
it potentially decreases. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The China/South Korea ban will increase the number of ICOs in other 
countries in the quarter after the ban. 
 This expected rush to the ICO market by entrepreneurs after the China/South Korea ICO 
ban—because of regulatory uncertainty, the possibility of stricter regulations in the (near) future, 
and a potentially weaker investors’ interest—can have at least two additional effects, both of which 
lower the quality of ICOs that enter the market. First, as entrepreneurs prematurely rush to the ICO 
market, this situation may limit the time they allocate to planning, including the development of 
their team, product, and vision. However, planning is crucial in an entrepreneurial context. Delmar 
and Shane (2003), for instance, find that planning reduces the probability of venture disbanding, 
and that it accelerates product development and venture organizing activities. Accordingly, a rush 
to the ICO market as a reaction to uncertainty post-China/South Korea ICO ban period could harm 
the overall quality of projects that enter the ICO market. 
Second, entrepreneurs with low-quality ICOs (and outright fraudsters) have particularly 
high incentives to rush to the market in a context where regulatory uncertainty is high and where 
investors’ interest is lower after the China/South Korea ICO ban. One reason for this expectation 
is that regulatory tightening would increase the cost of conducting an ICO. Consistent with the 
seminal work of Spence (1973) on signaling and the creation of a separating equilibrium between 
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high-quality and low-quality people (see also Fisch, 2019 for evidence from the ICO context), low-
quality entrepreneurs might be unable to bear the greater costs with the ICO process as regulations 
become stricter. Further, in a market with lower investors’ interest, lower quality ICOs will be the 
first to be affected, failing to raise the necessary funding. Additionally, research from the 
crowdfunding context, for instance, shows that fraudsters are particularly sensitive to growing costs 
both in terms of time and money: as costs increase the utility from committing fraud decreases 
(Cumming et al., 2020b). Accordingly, entrepreneurs conducting low-quality ICOs (including 
potential frauds) may have strong incentives to rush to the ICO market before any anticipated 
regulatory tightening and lower investors’ appetite following the China/South Korea ICO ban. This 
leads us to hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2: The China/South Korea ban will decrease the quality of ICOs in other 
countries in the quarter after the ban. 
Long-Term Spillover Hypotheses 
As we argued before, the regulatory uncertainty following the China/South Korea ban is 
expected to initiate a rush in ICOs related to entrepreneurs with existing ICO plans or those that 
were already in the process of developing ICO plans. Moreover, this rush will especially relate to 
lower-rated ICOs. However, once this initial rush is over, entrepreneurs that originally did not have 
existing ICO plans, or those that were not in the process of developing ICO plans, are expected to 
exhibit a different behavior. In the long-term, regulatory uncertainty may become particularly 
negative because the expectation of a ban (or potentially stricter regulation) in the future may 
decrease the likelihood that new entrepreneurs consider investing time and resources in starting an 
ICO process (e.g., Marcus et al., 2011).  
Moreover, the institutional legitimacy of a practice is particularly crucial for its adoption in 
the longer-term (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Guler et al., 2002). The China/South Korea ICO 
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ban is expected to hamper the institutional legitimacy of ICOs or the belief that ICOs represent 
proper entrepreneurial finance practices. Even when governments do not provide a motivation 
behind their regulatory review, their actions provide indirect information to market participants. 
As highlighted above, governments in China and South Korea provided direct information on the 
motivation of a ban, stressing the risks and problems associated with ICOs. Therefore, after the 
China/South Korea ban, the institutional legitimacy of ICOs in other countries might decrease and 
market participants might perceive ICOs to be less appropriate entrepreneurial finance practices. 
Consequently, new entrepreneurs become less likely to consider the ICO market an appropriate 
avenue to raise funds, making them less likely to consider launching an ICO; and, at the same time, 
ICO investors become increasingly less likely to contribute funds.  
Building on the notion that there are regulatory spillovers across jurisdictions, the 
China/South Korea ICO ban could limit the legitimacy of ICOs across borders (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001, 2003). For instance, Kucik and Pelc (2016: 713) showed that rulings 
related to human rights may have “the power to modify global norms” and an “ability to change 
actors’ expectations as to what constitutes acceptable behavior” even in countries that are not 
subject to the ruling. Consequently, as institutional legitimacy is crucial for the long-term adoption 
of new practices, the expected reduced institutional legitimacy of ICOs after the China/South Korea 
ban will prevent new entrepreneurs and investors from entering the ICO market. These effects 
might lead to a reinforcing cycle where both entrepreneurs and ICO investors become increasingly 
less likely to enter the ICO market. Accordingly, the number of ICOs gradually declines due to 
decreasing demand and supply. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3: After the China/South Korea ban, the long-term trend in the number of ICOs 
in other countries will decrease. 
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The increased difficulty to raise financing through ICOs and the cooling of the ICO market 
(due to the decreasing demand and supply discussed above) after the China/South Korea ICO ban 
may also bring an important quality advantage. An ICO professional highlighted that the China 
ICO ban could be “clearing the way for responsible token issuers”.11 We argue that after the 
China/South Korea ICO ban, there will be an upward trend in the average quality of ICOs for 
several reasons. 
 First, the cooling of the market makes it less attractive for entrepreneurs with low-quality 
(and potentially for fraudulent) ICOs. Indeed, as the efforts required to successfully raise funding 
increase due regulatory restrictions, it becomes economically less feasible for low quality ICOs to 
enter the market (e.g., Cumming et al., 2020b). Conversely, a cooling market might push 
entrepreneurs to increase the quality of their ICO projects to compete for the lower availability of 
ICO funding in the market. 
Second, despite the problems in the ICO market, some entrepreneurs and investors have 
ideological motivations to start ICOs or back ICOs, respectively (e.g., Fisch et al., 2019; Schückes 
and Gutmann, 2020). For instance, some entrepreneurs engage in ICOs to circumvent so-called 
undemocratic traditional investors, such as venture capitalists (Schückes and Gutmann, 2020). 
Fisch et al. (2019) argue that “while some investors appear insensitive to ideological motives… 
others care passionately about them”. These individuals, who care deeply about the ICO market, 
are expected to have strong self-regulating incentives to restore (or increase) the institutional 
legitimacy of ICOs after the ban. Entrepreneurs could do so by adopting global best practices, and 
investors (and the ICO community more broadly) could do so by increasing efforts to expose low-
quality projects (and scams). The fact that the ICO market is characterized by global ties further 





increases self-regulation pressures for entrepreneurs in low-regulation countries who are pushed to 
adopt strict standards (e.g., Christmann and Taylor, 2001).  
Taken together, the number of low-quality ICOs is expected to decrease after the 
China/South Korea ICO ban. Still, there remains a community with ideological motives that will 
push for high-quality ICOs. Accordingly, the average quality of ICOs is expected to gradually 
increase after the China/South Korea ICO ban. This leads to our final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: After the China/South Korea ban, the long-term trend in the quality of ICOs 
in other countries will increase.  
DATA AND VARIABLES 
Sample 
We test our hypotheses using a comprehensive sample of all ICOs worldwide from Q3 2015 
to Q3 2019. Prior to the beginning of our dataset, we could identify only four ICOs. Hence, we are 
able to cover the vast majority of ICOs happening from the early stages of the industry. We collect 
the ICO data from www.icobench.com. This website is regarded as one of the most representative 
sources of ICO data and has been used by prior researchers (e.g., Adhami and Guegan, 2019). 
Icobench provides data such as the location of the ICO, founders’ names, expert quality ratings, 
and amount fundraised. We collected data on 5,609 ICOs12 launched in 134 countries. As 
previously mentioned, our unit of analysis is the country-quarter-year. Thus, we coded ICO activity 
by country and quarter-year. By doing so, we obtained a sample of ICO activity for 17 quarters and 
134 countries, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, resulting in 2,278 country-quarter-year 
                                                 
12 We cannot use all ICOs due to missing variables. We lose observation at the ICO level due to lack of location (120 
ICOs that can be considered “global”), ICO launch date (1,630 ICOs), or fundraising amount (2,218 ICOs). Our 
country-quarter final sample is based on 3,838 ICOs. 
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observations.13 We remove observations from China and South Korea to avoid confounding effects 
since the ban was issued in those countries, and we also remove observations where ICOs cannot 
be attributed to any particular location. Some of these “location-less” ICOs can be considered 
missing data but, as reported in other studies (e.g., Adhami et al., 2018), some ICOs are truly global 
and are not attached to any particular country. In any case, these “location-less” ICOs are not 
included in our study. We further complemented ICO data with data collected from a number of 
additional sources, as described in more detail below.  
Variables 
In order to avoid reverse causality arguments, we use the one-period forward measure of 
our dependent variable. With this method, all our independent variables and controls predict the 
next period (quarter) ICOs, easing concerns of reverse causality.  
Dependent variables 
For this study, we use four different dependent variables. First, we measure the number of 
ICOs (No. of ICOs) in each country by counting the number of ICOs launched in each quarter-year 
in each country. To construct our second dependent variable, we use the average ICO rating 
obtained by the ICOs launched in a particularly country-quarter as dependent variable. The possible 
rating ranges from 1 to 5. As of the end of 2019, Icobench.com had more than 300 experts who 
provided more than 17,000 ICO ratings (most ICOs receive multiple ratings that are then averaged). 
As reported by the website “An ICObench expert is an active member of ICObench community that 
has the right to rate ICOs and conforms to the rules of the experts community. Each expert is 
assigned a number of points, what represents their distribution weight.” Accordingly, more 
                                                 
13 Our models usually have fewer observations due to missing variables for smaller countries. At the country level, 
some countries are too small and do not have IMF data, or other statistics, and hence are dropped out of our sample. 




prominent experts have a stronger influence on ratings. Each ICO receives four individual ratings 
(Benchy, Team, Vision, Product) and an average weighted rating that we use for our analyses.14 
We further exploit this data with our third and fourth dependent variable. We count the number of 
ICOs launched in each country-quarter whose ratings are in the top and bottom ten percent, 
respectively. ICOs in the top ten percent have a rating equal to or above 4/5, and the bottom ten 
percent have a rating equal to or below 2/5. These are considered high-quality and low-quality 
ICOs, respectively. In our robustness test, we also use different cut-offs.  
Figure 1 shows the average rating, as well as the number of high-quality and low-quality 
ICOs launched over time. It can be noted that the average ICO rating ranged between 2.5 and 2.7 
before the China/South Korea ban then increased to 3.3 in Q3 2019. The number of high-quality 
and low-quality ICOs increased to similar numbers up to 2018, but then the number of low-quality 
ICOs declined much faster compared to the high-quality ICOs. 
---- Insert Figure 1 about here ---- 
Independent variables 
Within our time period, two countries have banned ICOs from their jurisdiction. In 
particular, in Q3 2017 China has banned all firms and individuals from raising funds through ICO 
activities, reiterating that ICOs are considered illegal activity in the country. Several entities 
including the People’s Bank of China, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission, issued a joint statement announcing the ban. Similarly, during 
the same quarter, South Korea banned all ICO activities. The Korean Financial Services 
Commission declared all kinds of ICOs to be banned as trading of virtual currencies and argued 
that virtual currencies needed to be tightly controlled and monitored.  
                                                 
14 More details on how Icobench.com assigns an average rating can be accessed from https://icobench.com/ratings. 
Last accessed in January 2020. 
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The China/South Korea ban variable takes the value of 0 before Q3 2017, and then 1 from 
Q3 2017 to Q3 2019 (end of our data). Since we are interested in understanding what the effect of 
the ban is on the ICO market in other countries where there is no ban, the value is the same for 
every country in the dataset. From the main analyses, we remove the observations from China and 
South Korea to avoid confounding effects (i.e., a ban will obviously affect the China and South 
Korea market). Some countries communicated that cryptocurrencies are not a legal tender but, for 
the purpose of this study, they are not considered ICO bans since some businesses might still accept 
cryptocurrency payments by their own choice and ICOs are still permitted.  
To understand the pre-ban and post ban trends, we include two variables (Pre ban slope 
and Post ban slope). In doing so, we follow the methodology outlined by Lagarde (2012). The Pre 
ban slope is a variable that counts the number of quarters starting from 1 at the beginning of our 
data and then increasing for each quarter up to 8 in Q2 2017 (quarter prior to the China / South 
Korea ICO ban) and then continuing with the same value (8) till the end of our data in Q3 2019. 
The Post ban slope counts the number of quarters from the China/South Korea ICO ban starting 
with 1 in Q3 2017 and then increases for each quarter up to 5 in Q3 2019.  
Taken together, this empirical strategy allows us to see how our variables of interests were 
changing before the ban (with the Pre ban slope, which controls for any pre-ban trend in the data), 
how much they have changed immediately after the ban (with the China/South Korea ban dummy 
relating to our Hypotheses 1 and 2), and how much they have changed over the longer-term after 
the ban (with the Post ban slope relating to our Hypotheses 3 and 4). 
Controls 
As highlighted above, the Pre ban slope controls for any trend in the data before the 
China/South Korea ban. However, several other factors may affect the ICO industry, which we 
include as controls.  
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We control for the domestic market capitalization. We collected the total market 
capitalization (in millions of USD) of all stock exchanges in the focal country from the World 
Federation of Exchanges. When a country has more than one exchange (e.g., U.S.), we summed up 
the respective market capitalizations of each exchange (e.g., NYSE and NASDAQ). We averaged 
the daily value for each quarter and subsequently took the natural logarithm.  
We also control for (the natural logarithm of) the Bitcoin price. It is well known that virtual 
currencies are surrounded by speculation, and the price of Bitcoin is a good indicator of the 
popularity of virtual currencies. We use the average for the quarter, and we obtain our data from 
Coindesk, a reputable news provider about ICOs and virtual currencies’ prices.  
We capture public interest in ICOs by controlling for Google trend. Google trend reports 
the level of Google searches for the term “Initial Coin Offering” as reported by Google Trends. We 
translated “Initial Coin Offering” into the native language of each country and then included that 
in Google Trend. We averaged daily searches to get quarterly data in each country. This measure 
can range from 0-100, and is relative to the top of the period of interest as well as the U.S. which 
we use as a country of reference. 
To control for a country’s wealth, we include various International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
statistics such as the (natural logarithm of) GDP per capita in USD, GDP growth (winsorized to 
remove outliers), and Inflation which measure the annual changes in consumer prices (winsorized). 
Considering that ICOs are an Internet phenomenon, Internet penetration represents the total 
Internet users as a percentage of the total population in a country. Data were collected from the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) website for the years 2015-2017. Since ITU does 
not report 2018-2019 data, we complemented this with data from internetworldstats.com.15  
                                                 




We control for media attention with four different measures. To start, we collected Google 
News. We searched on Google News for the term “Initial Coin Offering” translated into the local 
language of each country using Google Translate. Considering that Google reports different news 
depending on the user’s location, we have run the same search changing our search location and 
quarter. From this, we collected the number of results available in each country-quarter. We use 
the natural logarithm of this measure to capture the amount of news related to ICOs in each country.  
We then downloaded all the available news with a limit of 300 per search (i.e., country-
quarter) imposed by Google. This provided a total of 179,983 pieces of news. We then used 
Amazon Web Services language detection to detect the language in which each news item was 
written and we then analyzed the title and the summary of each news item using a natural language 
processing (NLP) algorithm targeted to that particular language. NLP is a more advanced tool 
compared to other methods such as Lexicon, which only counts the number of certain keywords. 
In fact, NLP tries to understand the sentence construction and actual meaning, providing more 
accuracy. The final analysis assigns a value of positive, negative, mixed or neutral sentiment. To 
create the variable Google News sentiment, we calculated the percentage of articles in each country-
quarter that are positive and negative and then subtracted them to obtain a positive net sentiment 
(positive – negative).  
We then collected all Twitter channels for all ICOs launched. Twitter addresses are 
provided by icobench.com. After cleaning the data for erroneous or duplicate addresses, we 
downloaded all tweets and replies associated with each account. We obtained a total of 627,470 
original tweets and 866,150 replies. We use the natural logarithm of the sum of these two numbers 
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to account for Twitter activity in each quarter and country associated with the ICO channel. We 
then analyzed Twitter sentiment following the same procedure outlined for Google News.16  
We further hand-collected the monetary value stolen or hacked from cryptocurrency 
exchanges. For example, a famous hack happened in Japan in the first quarter of 2014 when 480 
million USD were stolen from the exchange Mt Gox.17 We used the coins’ value at the time of the 
hack. We summed the value of all hacks happening in each quarter all around the world (in 
unreported analyses we used the hacks in each particular country-quarter and results are consistent) 
to create Hacks in any country value (natural logarithm). We collected this data from various 
sources including, but not limited to, bitcoin.com, bitcointalk.org, coindesk.com. To ensure validity 
we made sure that our data was confirmed by at least two sources. 
Finally, we control for the quality of minority investors’ protection reported in the Ease of 
Doing Business ranking collected each year by the World Bank. Table 1 summarizes our variables 
and sources. 
---- Insert Table 1 about here ---- 
Estimation Method 
Three of our dependent variables are count measures (i.e. no. of ICOs and no. of Low/High 
Rating ICOs). For these dependent variables, reported in Tables 3 and 5, we run negative binomial 
regression models with country fixed effects (xtnbreg). For the other dependent variable, namely 
ICO rating (Table 4), considering that it is a continuous variable, we run a panel linear regression 
with country fixed effects. In both cases, country fixed effects allow us to account for unobserved 
                                                 
16 We also tried to control for Reddit sentiment but, unfortunately, Reddit does not report a precise timing for each 
post, so it is impossible to assign it to a particular quarter (when only years are available). In unreported analyses, we 
find that Reddit and Twitter activity and sentiment follow a similar pattern in terms of yearly distribution. We also 
attempted to download Telegram chats but these are encrypted and impossible to download. 
17 For more details: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-28/mt-gox-exchange-files-for-bankruptcy 
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heterogeneity at the country level. As previously mentioned, in order to avoid reverse causality 
arguments, we use the one-period forward measure of our dependent variable. This empirical 
strategy is also useful to attenuate endogeneity issues.  
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for our sample. The number 
of ICOs in each country-quarter ranges from 0 to a maximum of 101 (in the U.S. in Q4 2017). The 
average quarterly price of Bitcoin fluctuated extensively during the period from 255 USD to 10,404 
USD.18 The average ICO quality rating is 3.01 out of 5. Our descriptives also show that Google 
news sentiment was net negative, while Twitter was net positive. On average, 38 news articles were 
published in each quarter-country. Finally, the average period witnessed 285,000 USD hacked from 
exchanges, with a maximum of 702 million USD hacked in a quarter.  
---- Insert Table 2 about here ---- 
We now analyze our main results. As previously mentioned, to reduce causality concerns, 
in all tables we use one period forward dependent variables. This means that all variables predict 
the dependent variable one quarter ahead. Table 3 reports the analysis with the number of ICOs 
launched in each quarter-country. Interpreting results from model 4, we find that prior to the ban 
the number of ICOs was increasing. The ban has a positive and significant impact on the number 
of ICOs in the short term (consistent with Hypothesis 1), but a negative and significant impact 
longer-term (consistent with Hypothesis 3). Overall, we find that the number of ICOs increased 
before and right after the ban and then decreased in the quarters after the ban. Running 
exponentiated coefficients allows us to compute the economic meaning of these variables. We find 
that, controlling for all other factors, the number of ICOs increased by 130% for each quarter 
                                                 
18 Bitcoin reached an all-time high of about 20,000 USD in December 2017. However, our maximum value is lower 
because we average the daily price to obtain a quarterly value. In robustness tests we also control for Bitcoin volatility. 
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starting from the beginning of our sample, and received an additional boost of 83% by the ban, to 
then decrease by 21% for each quarter after the ban. Hence, we find statistically and economically 
meaningful results. 
---- Insert Table 3 about here ---- 
Table 4 reports our analyses related to the average expert quality rating of ICOs launched. 
Investigating model 4, we find no significant change in the average ICO rating before the ban and 
right after the ban, but we do find a positive and significant increase in the average ICO rating after 
the ban. This evidence does not support Hypothesis 2, but is consistent with Hypothesis 4. 
Interpreting the coefficients, we can see that for each quarter after the ban, the average rating 
increased by 0.065. Considering that the average ICO rating at the time of the ban was 2.55, a 0.065 
increase represents a 2.5% increase per each quarter from the ban. In other terms, each quarter after 
the ban, the average quality rating improved by approximately 1/10th of a standard deviation. 
Therefore, we find statistically and, somewhat, economically meaningful results. 
---- Insert Table 4 about here ---- 
Table 5 reports our analyses related to the number of low and high-quality ICOs. Models 
1-4 investigate the effect of our predictors on the number of low rated ICOs in the next quarter, 
while models 5-8 investigate the number of high rated ICOs. Studying model 4, we find that the 
number of low rated ICOs significantly increased before the ban, continued to significantly increase 
in the quarter after the ban (consistent with Hypothesis 2), but then declined in the longer term 
(consistent with Hypothesis 4). Interestingly, looking at model 8, we find very limited significant 
changes in the number of high rated ICOs before and after the ban. The only significant coefficient 
is the China/South Korea ban that is positive and marginally significant at ten percent levels. 
However, this coefficient is not significant in models 6-7. Running exponentiated coefficients 
allows us to compute the economic meaning of these variables. We find that from the beginning of 
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our dataset, the number of low rated ICOs increased 141% each quarter. This might suggest that 
the majority of ICOs launched pre-ban were of low quality. We also find that the ban increased the 
number of low rated ICOs by 133%. Finally, we find that, post-ban, the number of low rated ICOs 
declined by 45% for each additional quarter after the ban, while the decline in the number of high 
rated ICOs is not significant. This latter finding is remarkable by itself given the significant turmoil 
(and decline) in the global ICO market in the post ban period. We come back to this interesting 
difference between low- and high-rated ICOs in our discussion. 
---- Insert Table 5 about here ---- 
Robustness Tests 
In order to ensure the robustness of our findings, we run various robustness tests, related to 
reverse causality concerns, endogeneity and other concerns. 
Reverse causality and endogeneity concerns 
In order to reduce reverse causality and endogeneity concerns, we implement various 
strategies. First, all our models incorporate independent variables and controls that are calculated 
one quarter before the dependent variable. This strategy is commonly used in the entrepreneurship, 
economics, and finance literature (e.g., Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004; Buch, Koch and Koetter, 
2013; Clemens et al., 2012). Hence, every independent variable predicts the dependent variable in 
the next quarter.  
However, as reported by Moral-Benito, Allison and Williams (2019), it could happen that 
our dependent variable at time t influences the independent variables at t + 1, biasing our results 
with a feedback loop. This particular form of reverse causality can be accounted for with 
predetermined regressors (Arellano, 2003). The panel Arellano-Bond estimator is the most popular 
alternative for estimating dynamic panels with unobserved heterogeneity and predetermined 
regressors (Moral-Benito et al., 2019). Hence, we re-run our main models with the use of a panel 
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Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors. These models include the lag measure of the 
dependent variable. In Table 6 model 1, we test the impact of our predictors on the next quarter 
number of ICOs. In model 2, our dependent variable is the ICO average expert rating. Finally, in 
models 3 and 4, we turn our attention to the number of low- and high-rated ICOs. Results are 
identical to those reported in the main tables. The only difference is that the coefficient of the ban 
in model 4 is not significant, while it is positive and significant at ten percent in Table 5 model 8.  
---- Insert Table 6 about here ---- 
Second, our main analyses test whether the ban has an effect on the quality of ICOs 
launched. However, rather than changing the quality of ICOs, it might be that the experts’ 
composition or their perception change. Hence, we run a number of t-tests to rule out this 
alternative explanation. We test whether experts who are reviewing only before or only after the 
ban rate companies differently. We find that those reviewers who are only active before the ban 
give an average rating of 3.95, while reviewers who are only active after the ban give an average 
rating of 3.92. The difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.53). Further, the average review 
left before the ban by reviewers who are active only before the ban is 4.0, while the average review 
left before the ban by reviewers who are active both before and after the ban is 3.6. This difference 
is not statistically significant (p = 0.14). Further, the average review left after the ban by reviewers 
who are active only after the ban is 3.9, while the average review left after the ban by reviewers 
who are active both before and after the ban is 4.0. This difference is also not statistically significant 
(p = 0.74). Hence, our results are not driven by a change in experts’ composition or perception. 
Alternative econometric specifications 
In addition to the robustness tests mentioned above, we also run a Generalized Estimating 
Equation (GEE), reported in Table 7. The GEE approach for modeling longitudinal data accounts 
for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and accounts for the lack of independence across 
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observations for the country (Ballinger, 2004). For all GEE models (xtgee in Stata), we used an 
autoregressive correlation structure of one period, which assumes autocorrelation across periods 
within the same country. This is appropriate considering that previous periods are correlated in 
terms of ICOs. We adopt a logarithmic link to account for potential non-linearity of our dependent 
variables. Further, for reasons previously explained, we adopt a negative binomial family in models 
1, 3 and 4 and a Gaussian family for model 2. Finally, we use robust standard errors. The models’ 
composition follows the same pattern outlined for Table 6. Results are in line with those reported 
in Tables 3 (number of ICOs), Table 4 (average quality rating) and Table 5 (number of low and 
high quality ICOs). These results lend further support to our hypotheses. 
---- Insert Table 7 about here ---- 
ICO fundraising volume 
In our main analyses, we control for investors’ appetite by including Bitcoin price and 
Google trend, which accounts for changes in Internet searches for ICOs. We further control for 
media sentiment. We run an additional test using the ICO value (in USD) as dependent variable, 
which captures the intersection between demand and supply for ICOs. This variable is measured 
as the cumulative fundraising by all ICOs launched in each country-quarter. In some cases, 
icobench.com reports the amount in crypto-coins (e.g., 3,000 Bitcoins) raised, rather than a USD 
value. In those cases, we compute the USD equivalent at the ICO launch by looking at the exchange 
rate between the coins and the USD.  
Table 8 reports our results related to the value of fundraising for ICOs in each country-
quarter. When interpreting results from model 4, we find that before the ban the value fundraised 
was increasing significantly. Our results also show that the value of fundraising was not impacted 
by the ban in the short term, meaning that investors did not follow entrepreneurs in rushing to the 
market immediately after the ban. In the long term, however, the value significantly decreased.  
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---- Insert Table 8 about here ---- 
Additional tests 
We argue that in the short term, because of regulatory uncertainty, entrepreneurs with 
existing ICO plans rush to the market (i.e., Hypothesis 1). An alternative explanation of our short-
term findings is that right after the ICO ban in China/South Korea, entrepreneurs in other countries 
had their ICOs lined up and could not easily withdraw the ICO. However, this explanation is not 
reasonable for two reasons. First, ICOs can be withdrawn quickly and unilaterally by the 
entrepreneur. The China ban happened on the 4th and South Korea on the 29th of September 2017. 
All around the world, we have only 21 ICOs starting from 1st to 7th of September and 42 from 
26th of September to 2nd of October. These ICOs represent 0.37% and 0.75% of our sample, very 
small proportions, which cannot explain our economically very significant results. Second, this 
alternative explanation is not consistent with the observed decline in the quality of the ICOs 
immediately after the ban. 
We also ran different models and additional control variables. First, it might be argued that 
international news is just as relevant as local news. Although Google News also reports 
international news, it might be skewed in local news in a local language. For example, an article 
published in the Financial Times (UK newspaper) is going to be read in other countries and, 
consequently, affect ICO activity in those countries. Therefore, it would be sensible to control for 
worldwide Google news and, as a robustness test, we use this measure rather than the country-
specific measure. Results are consistent with those reported. 
Second, we include additional control variables. In particular, we control for additional 
economic variables that might affect ICO activity, such as the “ease of getting credit” reported by 
the World Bank. If entrepreneurs can easily raise credit, they might be less inclined to launch an 
ICO. We further control for Bitcoin volatility. It might be argued that higher volatility renders 
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fundraising and investments less predictable, harming the industry. Results are consistent with 
those reported. 
Further, we have selected the top and bottom ten percent in terms of ICO quality ratings. In 
robustness tests, we test the sensitivity of our findings to different levels. We therefore try using 
the top and bottom five and fifteen percent. In both tests, we have identical results for the low rating 
ICOs. In terms of high rating ICOs, we find very similar results. The only significant difference 
arises in the top fifteen percent of ICOs where the ban coefficient is positive but not significant, 
and the Pre ban slope is positive but significant. Overall, these results provide further support for 
our findings. 
Finally, we run a VIF analysis to investigate whether multicollinearity is an issue in our 
sample. We find that multicollinearity is not an issue of concern when interpreting our findings 
because VIFs are below the threshold of 10 (Kutner, Neter, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman, 2004). 
However, in Table 3, we find that Bitcoin price has a high VIF value. This is not surprising 
considering that Bitcoin is a thermometer for the industry, and it is, therefore, related to other 
variables. Although it is safe to ignore high VIFs related to variables that only serve as controls,19 
we re-run our analyses related to Table 3 removing the variable of Bitcoin price. The average VIF 
is 2.23 and the maximum VIF is 5.65, well within acceptable standards. Also, with the exclusion 
of Bitcoin price our results do not change. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper extended institutional theory and evidence to the context of ICOs—an 
innovative entrepreneurial finance market (e.g., Fisch, 2019). Unlike other contexts, ICOs are 
unique because they may operate independently of a national identity. Consequently, it is unclear 
                                                 
19 Source: https://statisticalhorizons.com/multicollinearity 
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the extent to which ICOs are in fact related to country regulatory institutions. We developed new 
hypotheses pertaining to government regulations and, more specifically, how changes in country 
regulatory institutions influence ICO activity in other countries. We developed an institutional 
theory of regulatory spillovers, which suggests that regulatory bans in specific countries can have 
different short-term and long-term spillover effects from one jurisdiction to another. The data 
examined comprised ICO activity from up to 108 countries between Q3 2015 and Q3 2019. The 
data is consistent with the view that the China/South Korea ICO ban—the most notable regulatory 
event during the period of our study—impacts the number and quality of ICOs in other countries, 
and that short-term and long-term spillover effects are fundamentally different.  
Academic Contributions 
Our study makes several contributions to multiple literature streams. Understanding the 
functioning and dynamics of innovative entrepreneurial finance markets, such as the ICO market, 
is a premier topic in entrepreneurial finance and the broader entrepreneurship literature (Bellavitis 
et al., 2017; Block et al., 2018, 2020; Fisch et al., 2019; Martino et al., 2019). Our study adds to an 
emerging literature on ICOs. Most closely related to our work is the paper by Huang et al. (2019), 
who examine the relationship between factor markets and institutions in specific countries and ICO 
activity in those countries using a cross-sectional dataset of ICO activity covering more than 100 
countries. We bring new longitudinal evidence on (a) how regulatory changes may have spillover 
effects in other countries and (b) how these regulatory spillover effects are different in the short-
term versus the long-term. 
Specifically, our data shows that in the short-term the China/South Korea ban has increased 
the number of ICOs in other countries. Accordingly, in the short-term, entrepreneurs rushed to the 
market to launch ICOs in other countries. Consistent with our expectations, this short-term rush 
was predominantly comprised of lower-rated ICOs. In the longer-term, however, the China/South 
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Korea ban has decreased the number of ICOs, as well as the fundraising volume in other countries. 
Notably, in the longer-term, there is a more positive trend in the average quality of ICOs in other 
countries, and especially lower-rated ICOs gradually disappeared from the ICO market. 
The different patterns in lower-rated ICOs and higher-rated ICOs in the short-term and 
longer-term after the China/South-Korea ban is especially noteworthy. Our findings suggest that 
in the short-term, the ban triggered a sharp increase in ICOs. This increase is related to lower-rated 
ICOs, which rushed to the market amid expectations of a closing window of opportunity. In 
contrast, higher-rated ICOs need careful planning as they cannot easily be sped up. Accordingly, 
the number of higher-quality ICOs did not jump in the short-term after the ban. In the longer-term, 
the number of lower-quality ICOs kept gradually decreasing over time. Our estimates suggest a 
drop in ICOs of about 21% for each quarter after the ban, which is much larger than the best 
estimate of the number of ICO frauds in academic work. Hornuf et al. (2019) identify about 20% 
of all ICOs from September 2016 to July 2018 as confirmed or suspected fraud cases.20 
Consequently, the longer-term drop in ICOs after the China/South Korea ICO ban is unlikely to be 
exclusively driven by a reduced number of outright fraud cases but is also driven by a reduced 
number of genuine lower-quality ICOs. Moreover, our findings also show that in the longer-term 
after the ban, a very robust set of higher-quality ICOs entered the market. The resilience of higher-
quality ICOs is remarkable by itself, given the extreme turbulence and significant contraction 
experienced by the global ICO market in the post-ban period. 
                                                 
20 Although some practitioner reports (https://research.bloomberg.com/pub/res/d28giW28tf6G7T_Wr77aU0gDgFQ) 
have reported much higher fraud cases compared to Hornuf et al. (2019), these practitioner reports also suggest that 
ICO funding volume is largely unaffected by the fraud cases (estimates suggest only about 11% of funding went to 
identified fraud cases; and when three big scams were removed only 0.3% of all time ICO fundraising went to fraud 
cases). Still, our findings show a much sharper drop in ICO funding volume in the longer-term after the China/South-
Korea ban. This fact again suggests that fraud cases alone do not drive our findings related to lower-quality ICOs.  
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Our theory, and related empirical evidence, also contribute outside the ICO literature and, 
more specifically, to the literature at the intersection of entrepreneurship and institutional theory 
(Bruton et al., 2010; Tolbert et al., 2011). Extant entrepreneurship research drawing on institutional 
theory has almost exclusively focused on how country institutions influence the breadth and depth 
of “traditional” entrepreneurial finance markets, such as their venture capital markets (e.g., Groh 
et al., 2010; Li and Zahra, 2012), or the quantity and quality of entrepreneurship (e.g., Armour and 
Cumming, 2008; Estrin et al., 2013; Stenholm et al., 2013) within the same country. Within this 
literature, governments, for example, are often depicted as powerful actors, who through rule-
setting and coercive pressures (i.e., monitoring and sanctioning activities) influence entrepreneurial 
finance markets and entrepreneurship within their own jurisdiction. Implicitly, these same 
governments are assumed to have a limited impact outside their own jurisdiction, or, at a minimum, 
such possible effects are not the focus of investigation. 
We present an institutional theory of regulatory spillover that brings a novel perspective to 
extant entrepreneurship research that draws on institutional theory. We show that national 
governments are impactful not only within their own jurisdictions. In an increasingly digital, 
global, and decentralized world, governments, through their regulatory actions, can also influence 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance markets, such as ICO markets, outside their own 
jurisdiction (i.e., in other countries). We specifically argue that regulatory actions by governments, 
such as the ICO ban in China and South Korea, may increase regulatory uncertainty in other 
countries and affect the institutional legitimacy of an entrepreneurial finance practice. Accordingly, 
a ban in one country can affect people’s behavior and market dynamics in other countries, even 
when the governments that ban ICOs have no coercive powers in other jurisdictions. 
Our theory and empirical evidence that an ICO ban can have fundamentally different short-
term and longer-term effects also contribute to extant literature at the intersection of 
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entrepreneurship and institutional theory. Most of this literature has presented a more static 
perspective on how specific (regulatory) institutions relate to entrepreneurship and/or examines 
whether specific institutions are “good” or “bad” for entrepreneurial finance markets or 
entrepreneurship (see Lee et al., 2011). Our evidence suggests that the same ban might, in the short-
term, have negative consequences in that it causes a low-quality rush of ICOs in other countries. 
At the same time, in the long-term, the ban cools down the market but has positive consequences 
in that the average quality of ICOs increases.  
Taken together, we want to come back to the opening question from the introduction of our 
paper. With the development of innovative entrepreneurial financing practices such as ICOs, an 
important question in entrepreneurship theory and practice arises as to whether or not country 
regulatory institutions still matter in this context, and if so, how? Common wisdom suggests that a 
regulatory ban in one or two countries will have “no effect in the physical space” that is increasingly 
digital, global and decentralized; if anything, it may only harm the markets and entrepreneurship 
in the countries that ban.21 Our theory and evidence point to the opposite. Regulatory institutions 
still matter in an increasingly digital, global and decentralized world. Regulatory spillovers, in 
particular, can be very impactful. By focusing on such regulatory spillovers and their distinct short-
term and long-term effects, our study provides important theoretical and empirical contributions to 
entrepreneurship research and institutional theory. 
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
Our study has several limitations that may be addressed by future research. Although we 
have controlled for market factors such as the capitalization of public markets, we have studied 
ICOs in isolation from other entrepreneurial finance sources. It would be interesting to understand 
                                                 
21 Source: https://bravenewcoin.com/insights/china-ico-ban-proving-ineffective 
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how different markets interact. For example, future studies could explore how and whether 
business angel, venture capital, crowdfunding and ICO markets interact. Similarly, it would be 
interesting to explore whether regulation has not only a cross-country impact, but also a cross-
market influence (e.g., ICO regulation has an impact on crowdfunding).  
We currently study the ICO ban on ICO launches in countries other than China and South 
Korea. It would be interesting to study how regulatory changes in one country affect regulatory 
initiatives in other countries. At the same time, the regulatory environment, especially for ICOs, 
changes fast. It would be interesting to investigate the impact of regulatory changes beyond the 
ban, for example through regulation other than a ban. 
 As financial technology continues to evolve, further studies on the causes and consequences 
of such innovations for entrepreneurship and finance are warranted. It is natural to envisage that 
these studies in international contexts will be linked to their institutional settings. Innovations in 
financial technology, however, have the potential to become increasingly disconnected from 
national institutions. Through new financial technologies, there is potential for regulatory 
spillovers from one to another region, as we have seen here with ICO bans. Overall, financial 
technology innovations in the future will likely offer many new promising avenues to further 
develop institutional theory and settings to test these theories. 
 As more time passes in the post-Covid pandemic environment, we may expect reduced 
access to finance for entrepreneurial ventures. As such, there is reason to believe that ICOs might 
see a comeback in a more digital post-pandemic environment, and there might be pressures to ease 
regulations to enable more ICOs. These types of developments could offer additional opportunities 
for future work. 
Practical Implications for Policy-makers and Entrepreneurs 
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Our theory and empirical evidence indicate that the ICO bans in China and South Korea 
influenced ICO numbers and quality in other countries. From a policy perspective, this finding is 
particularly important as it shows the importance of international coordination in ICO regulation 
and policies. National regulators and policymakers cannot operate independently in a vacuum 
without regard to other countries’ policies towards ICOs. Our findings entail both a cautionary note 
and a promising note. Policymakers should be particularly concerned that regulatory actions in 
other countries can, for example, create a rush of lower-rated ICOs in their own jurisdictions. 
However, our findings also suggest that regulatory actions, in specific countries, can eventually 
have positive effects in other jurisdictions, for example, by increasing the average quality rating of 
ICOs in the longer term. Regulators should be mindful of the effect of international regulation on 
both the size and quality of their ICO market. It is important to ensure quality standards, but also 
leave room for entrepreneurs to operate without prohibitive legal obstacles.  
 The development of innovative entrepreneurial finance markets is a critical policy concern 
because these markets influence entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs, especially 
those with high growth potential, often require external financial resources to realize their potential 
(Cassar, 2004). However, it is also well-known that entrepreneurs frequently experience constraints 
in accessing sufficient external funds. The ICO market represents a new source of financing for 
entrepreneurs. Accordingly, it enlarges the range of external financing sources that are available to 
them. Our findings suggest that the ICO market has changed dramatically after the China/South 
Korea ICO ban. The number of ICOs launched, albeit lower than in the pre-ban period, is still 
plentiful and their average quality has increased. For entrepreneurs interested in approaching the 
ICO market, these findings suggest that the hurdles to raise money have increased. Accordingly, 
more time and other resources may be required to develop successful ICO plans. Our findings 
further suggest that entrepreneurs that are actively preparing for an ICO need not only monitor the 
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regulatory environment in their own jurisdictions but also in other countries. Regulatory changes 
in other countries can have a significant impact on the environment in which entrepreneurs will 
potentially raise ICO funding.    
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Table 1: Variable description 
Variable name Description Unit of observation Data source 
No. of ICO 
Number of ICOs launched in each country. We code each ICO based on the country reported on ICO 





et al. 2018) 
Value of ICOs Amount raised (in USD) by the ICOs launched in each country. Country-quarter Icobench.com 
ICO rating Average rating received by ICOs launched in each country. Country-quarter Icobench.com 
No. of Low Rating 
ICOs 
Number of ICOs launched in each country with a rating in top decile (below or equal to 2 out of 5) Country-quarter Icobench.com 
No. of High Rating 
ICOs 
Number of ICOs launched in each country with a rating in top decile (above or equal to 4 out of 5) Country-quarter Icobench.com 
Domestic market 
capitalization 
Sum of the capitalization of all public markets in a given country. Log transformed. Country-quarter 
World Federation of 
Exchanges 
Bitcoin price Average quarterly Bitcoin price. Log transformed. Country-quarter Coindesk 
Google trend (ICO) 
Standardized Google search for the word “Initial coin offering”. Results are standardized within and across 
countries. United States is the reference country for cross-country standardization. 
Country-quarter Google Trends 
GDP growth Percentage growth in GDP per capita. Winsorized. Country-year IMF 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in USD. Log transformed. Country-year IMF 
Inflation Change in consumer prices. Winsorized. Country-year IMF 
Internet penetration Percentage of population with Internet access Country-year ITU/ Internetworldstats 
Google news Number of news related to ICOs reported on Google News for each country-quarter. Log transformed. Country-quarter Google News 
Twitter activity Number of Tweets and replies published in ICO channels in each country. Log transformed. Country-quarter Twitter 
Google news 
sentiment 
Percentage of positive minus negative sentiment for Google news  Country-quarter Google News 
Twitter sentiment Percentage of positive minus negative sentiment for Twitter posts and replies Country-quarter Twitter 
Hacks in any country 
value 
Sum of value in USD of all exchange hacks around the world in each quarter. Log transformed. Global-quarter Various sources 
Pre ban slope 
Variable that counts the number of quarters starting from 1 at the beginning of our data and then increasing 
for each quarter up to 8 in Q2 2017 (quarter prior to the China / South Korea ICO ban) and then continuing 




Dummy variable coded as 1 if ICOs have been banned in any country-quarter (i.e., China, South Korea). 
The dummy is the same for all countries in our dataset. 
Country-quarter 
China and South Korea 
governments 
Post ban slope 
Variable that counts the number of quarters from the China / South Korea ICO ban starting with 1 in Q3 











Obs. Mean S. D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 No. of ICOs 2227 1.68 6.88 0.00 101.00
2 Value of ICOs 2227 3.03 6.33 0.00 21.25 0.52*
3 ICO rating 608 3.01 0.62 1.00 4.70 0.01 0.10*
4 no. of Low Rating ICOs 2227 0.15 0.91 0.00 19.00 0.78* 0.37* -0.20*
5 no. of High Rating ICOs 2227 0.22 1.05 0.00 17.00 0.80* 0.46* 0.22* 0.43*
6 Domestic market cap (ln) 2117 5.46 6.01 0.00 17.39 0.23* 0.28* -0.13* 0.20* 0.16*
7 Bitcoin price (ln) 2227 7.67 1.30 5.54 9.25 0.22* 0.36* 0.16* 0.15* 0.19* -0.00
8 Google trend 2158 8.54 12.71 0.00 81.00 0.33* 0.40* 0.17* 0.32* 0.19* 0.19* 0.42*
9 GDP growth (w) 1921 2.86 2.42 -7.10 8.10 -0.00 0.06* -0.08 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.04* 0.11*
10 GDP per capita (ln) 1904 9.21 1.25 6.22 11.65 0.21* 0.27* 0.06 0.15* 0.19* 0.35* 0.03 0.11* -0.23*
11 Inflation (w) 1913 4.48 13.07 -1.60 121.70 -0.03 -0.07* 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09* 0.04* -0.03 -0.41* -0.20*
12 Internet penetration 2213 72.29 20.41 7.70 98.90 0.12* 0.15* 0.06 0.07* 0.12* 0.16* 0.07* 0.15* -0.14* 0.55* -0.12*
13 Google news (ln) 2227 5.10 3.66 0.00 15.66 0.12* 0.28* 0.09* 0.07* 0.10* 0.22* 0.46* 0.31* 0.03 0.14* 0.03 0.21*
14 Twitter activity (ln) 2227 2.28 2.84 0.00 10.06 0.47* 0.66* 0.30* 0.29* 0.44* 0.30* 0.54* 0.38* 0.03 0.34* -0.05 0.19* 0.43*
15 Google News sentiment 2227 -0.25 0.02 -0.07 0.04 -0.07* -0.09* -0.15* -0.02 -0.08* 0.00 -0.24* -0.13* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.09* -0.15*
16 Twitter sentiment 2227 0.13 0.21 -1.00 1.00 0.21* 0.39* 0.26* 0.11* 0.23* 0.18* 0.41* 0.26* 0.03 0.25* -0.05* 0.16* 0.35* 0.67* -0.10*
17 Hacks in any country value (ln) 2227 12.56 7.27 0.00 20.37 0.15* 0.25* -0.07 0.10* 0.13* -0.01 0.46* 0.30* 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.24* 0.27* -0.12* 0.21*
18 Protecting minority investors 1904 58.73 12.46 10.00 85.00 0.15* 0.20* 0.00 0.11* 0.13* 0.35* 0.08* 0.21* 0.14* 0.31* -0.22* 0.27* 0.29* 0.25* -0.02 0.18* 0.03
19 Pre ban slope 2227 6.35 2.35 1.00 8.00 0.17* 0.30* 0.14* 0.11* 0.14* -0.00 0.89* 0.31* 0.06* 0.03 0.05* 0.08* 0.41* 0.44* -0.19* 0.33* 0.54* 0.07*
20 China / Korea Ban 2227 0.52 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.22* 0.35* 0.21* 0.13* 0.19* -0.00 0.92* 0.39* 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07* 0.46* 0.55* -0.19* 0.42* 0.43* 0.07* 0.74*
21 Post ban slope 2227 2.64 3.12 0.00 9.00 0.11* 0.21* 0.44* 0.01 0.17* -0.00 0.75* 0.11* -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05* 0.39* 0.50* -0.23* 0.40* 0.18* 0.08* 0.79* 0.59*
Absolute correlations with * significant at p  < 0.005. Variables with (ln) have been logarihm transformed to reduce overdispersion, while variables with (w) have been winsorized to reduce the influence of outliers.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Domestic market cap (ln) 0.011 0.011 0.025 0.02
[0.025] [0.025] [0.028] [0.032]
Bitcoin price (ln) 0.967*** 0.959*** 0.204† 0.254**
[0.077] [0.109] [0.108] [0.090]
Google trend 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.007**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
GDP growth (w) 0.131** 0.131** 0.068† -0.089*
[0.043] [0.043] [0.041] [0.040]
GDP per capita (ln) 0.347* 0.347* 0.570** 0.586**
[0.164] [0.164] [0.190] [0.227]
Inflation (w) 0.016 0.016 0.006 -0.017
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014]
Internet penetration -0.003 -0.003 -0.017* -0.015†
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]
Google news (ln) 0.007 0.007 -0.030 0.008
[0.028] [0.028] [0.026] [0.027]
Twitter activity (ln) 0.002 0.001 0.022 0.148***
[0.030] [0.031] [0.030] [0.032]
Google News sentiment 10.757*** 10.736*** 9.292*** 3.352*
[1.540] [1.553] [1.514] [1.438]
Twitter sentiment 0.02 0.02 0.044 0.183
[0.243] [0.243] [0.230] [0.216]
Hacks in any country value (ln) 0.009 0.009 -0.026* -0.008
[0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.011]
Protecting minority investors -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 0.004
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.015]
Pre ban slope 0.822*** 0.863***
[0.091] [0.087]
China/South Korea ban 0.027 0.269 0.606***
[0.250] [0.169] [0.134]
Post ban slope -0.245***
[0.022]
Constant -10.576*** -10.522*** -11.191*** -12.049***
[1.594] [1.670] [1.896] [2.169]
Observations (Countries) 1444 (92) 1444 (92) 1444 (92) 1444 (92)
VIF 1.80 2.61 4.36 4.52
Chi square 830.7*** 830.4*** 696.6*** 949.4***
All models fit a panel negative binomial regression (xtnbreg). This is appropriate considering 
that the dependent variable is a count measure, overdispersed and with many zeroes. We 
include country fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. All variables are lagged 




Table 4. The effect of the ban on the average rating of ICOs launched 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Domestic market cap (ln) 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.042
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.042]
Bitcoin price (ln) 0.197** 0.202* 0.211* 0.203*
[0.068] [0.082] [0.093] [0.092]
Google trend -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
GDP growth (w) -0.143*** -0.144*** -0.142*** -0.088*
[0.038] [0.038] [0.039] [0.042]
GDP per capita (ln) 0.655 0.653 0.685 0.026
[0.654] [0.656] [0.674] [0.701]
Inflation (w) -0.065* -0.065* -0.064† -0.05
[0.032] [0.033] [0.034] [0.034]
Internet penetration -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Google news (ln) -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.016
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028]
Twitter activity (ln) 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.005
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024]
Google News sentiment -0.538 -0.523 -0.413 0.275
[1.152] [1.162] [1.276] [1.283]
Twitter sentiment 0.686*** 0.685*** 0.681*** 0.650***
[0.167] [0.168] [0.169] [0.168]
Hacks in any country value (ln) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Protecting minority investors 0.055* 0.055* 0.055* 0.042†
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
Pre ban slope -0.012 -0.011
[0.055] [0.055]
China/South Korea ban -0.014 -0.019 -0.16
[0.132] [0.134] [0.140]
Post ban slope 0.065**
[0.021]
Constant -8.082 -8.087 -8.404 -1.335
[6.300] [6.308] [6.492] [6.835]
Observations (Countries) 504 (92) 504 (92) 504 (92) 504 (92)
VIF 1.72 2.06 2.30 2.47
R-squared 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.305
All models fit a panel linear regression (xtreg). This is appropriate considering that the dependent 
variable is continuous and normally distributed. We include country fixed effects to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity. All variables are lagged by one period. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p 
< 0.05 and † p < 0.10 (two tailed tests).    
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Table 5. The effect of the ban on the number of low and high quality ICOs launched 
Dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Domestic market cap (ln) -0.148 -0.157 -0.204 0.361† 0.049 0.046 0.045 0.077
[0.192] [0.187] [0.320] [0.212] [0.131] [0.137] [0.139] [0.153]
Bitcoin price (ln) 1.197*** 1.111*** 0.051 0.545* 1.161*** 0.949*** 0.895*** 0.882***
[0.185] [0.234] [0.258] [0.222] [0.183] [0.221] [0.233] [0.229]
Google trend 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.036*** 0.001 0.009* 0.010* 0.011* 0.006
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006]
GDP growth (w) 0.239* 0.248* 0.162 -0.339* -0.073 -0.066 -0.072 -0.128
[0.121] [0.120] [0.128] [0.143] [0.087] [0.086] [0.086] [0.094]
GDP per capita (ln) 0.661 0.683 0.849 0.603 1.368† 1.510† 1.537† 1.457†
[0.450] [0.446] [0.617] [1.060] [0.773] [0.791] [0.797] [0.809]
Inflation (w) 0.045 0.051 -0.012 -0.279* -0.113 -0.108 -0.115 -0.148
[0.094] [0.093] [0.116] [0.119] [0.085] [0.084] [0.086] [0.091]
Internet penetration 0.022 0.022 -0.002 0.032 -0.028 -0.029 -0.031 -0.027
[0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.031] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021]
Google news (ln) -0.064 -0.068 -0.134† -0.029 0.076 0.061 0.061 0.069
[0.063] [0.063] [0.069] [0.088] [0.080] [0.078] [0.078] [0.078]
Twitter activity (ln) -0.227** -0.241** -0.197* 0.041 0.209* 0.167† 0.167† 0.206*
[0.075] [0.079] [0.080] [0.084] [0.085] [0.089] [0.089] [0.093]
Google News sentiment 15.314*** 15.006*** 19.342*** 4.495 7.706** 6.453* 6.027† 4.774
[3.517] [3.565] [4.259] [4.435] [2.956] [3.109] [3.165] [3.271]
Twitter sentiment -0.781 -0.76 -0.518 0.057 0.710 0.798 0.811 0.844
[0.666] [0.669] [0.683] [0.631] [0.585] [0.586] [0.587] [0.590]
Hacks in any country value (ln) -0.009 -0.008 -0.040† -0.021 -0.020 -0.028 -0.035 -0.017
[0.025] [0.025] [0.023] [0.019] [0.037] [0.040] [0.040] [0.043]
Protecting minority investors 0.013 0.013 0.008 -0.088 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.026
[0.031] [0.031] [0.040] [0.070] [0.068] [0.068] [0.069] [0.072]
Pre ban slope 0.917*** 0.883*** 0.145 0.132
[0.171] [0.173] [0.213] [0.217]
China/South Korea ban 0.296 0.697† 0.847** 0.975 0.850 1.042†
[0.506] [0.361] [0.262] [0.609] [0.608] [0.611]
Post ban slope -0.603*** -0.08
[0.080] [0.054]
Constant -15.665*** -15.211*** -11.145* -11.599 -21.600** -21.172** -21.646** -22.025**
[4.012] [4.121] [5.335] [9.535] [6.967] [7.105] [7.234] [7.313]
Observations (Countries) 788 (50) 788 (50) 788 (50) 788 (50) 825 (52) 825 (52) 825 (52) 825 (52)
Chi square 164.6*** 164.6*** 143.5*** 247.5*** 196.9*** 179.3*** 171.4*** 174.3***
no. of Low Rating ICOs no. of High Rating ICOs
All models fit a panel negative binomial regression (xtnbreg). This is appropriate considering that the dependent variable is a count measure, overdispersed and 
with many zeroes. We include country fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. All variables are lagged by one period. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 
0.01, * p < 0.05 and † p < 0.10 (two tailed tests).    
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Table 6. The effect of the ban on the different dependent variables. Arellano-Bond models.  
 
 
Dependent variable No of ICOs ICO rating ICOs Low rating ICOs High rating
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Lag (1) dependent variable 0.715*** -0.126 0.629*** 0.422**
[0.037] [0.086] [0.038] [0.158]
Domestic market cap (ln) 0.230 0.023 -0.023 0.004
[0.284] [0.017] [0.025] [0.020]
Bitcoin price (ln) -1.314* 0.194† -0.073 0.092
[0.612] [0.107] [0.097] [0.109]
Google trend 0.089** -0.002 -0.008 0.020**
[0.032] [0.003] [0.007] [0.006]
GDP growth (w) -0.026 0.003 -0.025 0.009
[0.085] [0.068] [0.017] [0.020]
GDP per capita (ln) -4.336 3.238* -0.552 -0.566
[3.658] [1.391] [0.534] [0.486]
Inflation (w) 0.004 0.040 -0.004 -0.003
[0.025] [0.051] [0.003] [0.003]
Internet penetration -0.049† -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
[0.028] [0.009] [0.003] [0.003]
Google news (ln) 0.140 -0.041† -0.011 0.003
[0.175] [0.024] [0.024] [0.031]
Twitter activity (ln) -0.086 -0.022 -0.011 0.012
[0.106] [0.043] [0.019] [0.019]
Google News sentiment 6.607*** 0.292 0.881* 1.036*
[1.786] [1.564] [0.393] [0.403]
Twitter sentiment -0.265 0.249 -0.068 -0.009
[0.476] [0.261] [0.164] [0.087]
Hacks in any country value (ln) -0.040* -0.007 -0.004 -0.007*
[0.019] [0.012] [0.003] [0.003]
Protecting minority investors 0.161 0.092* 0.012 0.011
[0.106] [0.040] [0.019] [0.012]
Pre ban slope 0.654* -0.074 0.094* -0.016
[0.261] [0.084] [0.037] [0.024]
China/South Korea ban 2.045** -0.110 0.358** -0.005
[0.729] [0.139] [0.130] [0.063]
Post ban slope -0.344** 0.090** -0.079* 0.014
[0.128] [0.032] [0.031] [0.012]
Constant 38.026 -35.394** 5.158 4.187
[35.121] [13.680] [4.475] [4.488]
Observations (Countries) 1502 (108) 287 (57) 1502 (108) 1502 (108)
Chi square 2051.51*** 106.55*** 1061.51*** 89.77***
All models are Arellano-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation models (xtabond). These models 
include a lagged dependent variable as predictor, assuming correlation across periods. Each model has 




Table 7. The effect of the ban on the different dependent variables. GEE models. 
 
 
Dependent variable No of ICOs ICO rating ICOs Low rating ICOs High rating
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Domestic market cap (ln) 0.041* -0.005** 0.091*** -0.030
[0.021] [0.002] [0.025] [0.021]
Bitcoin price (ln) -0.024 0.032 0.091 0.681**
[0.129] [0.040] [0.260] [0.215]
Google trend 0.009* 0.001 0.004 0.002
[0.004] [0.001] [0.009] [0.007]
GDP growth (w) 0.064 -0.005 -0.012 0.080
[0.043] [0.005] [0.068] [0.069]
GDP per capita (ln) 0.301*** 0.013 0.034 0.291*
[0.084] [0.013] [0.165] [0.123]
Inflation (w) 0.004 0.000 -0.041 0.015
[0.007] [0.006] [0.030] [0.012]
Internet penetration -0.007 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.006] [0.001] [0.008] [0.008]
Google news (ln) -0.007 0.006*** -0.042† -0.022
[0.017] [0.002] [0.024] [0.026]
Twitter activity (ln) 0.501*** 0.004 0.488*** 0.770***
[0.062] [0.006] [0.082] [0.077]
Google News sentiment 5.795** 0.261 4.748 9.917**
[2.120] [0.686] [5.172] [3.557]
Twitter sentiment -0.663* 0.160** -1.473* -0.566
[0.332] [0.058] [0.641] [0.542]
Hacks in any country value (ln) -0.025* 0.002 -0.026 0.018
[0.011] [0.004] [0.021] [0.059]
Protecting minority investors 0.005 -0.000 0.020* 0.007
[0.006] [0.001] [0.009] [0.009]
Pre ban slope 0.829*** -0.061* 0.667*** -0.073
[0.099] [0.024] [0.186] [0.214]
China/South Korea ban 0.307 -0.008 0.742† 0.162
[0.199] [0.064] [0.405] [0.651]
Post ban slope -0.290*** 0.032*** -0.651*** -0.107†
[0.035] [0.007] [0.096] [0.058]
Constant -10.068*** 0.976*** -9.925*** -13.788***
[1.092] [0.212] [2.032] [1.783]
Observations (Countries) 1,563 (103) 234 (30) 1,563 (103) 1,563 (103)
Chi square 1391.0*** 262.7*** 497.5*** 760.1***
All models are GEE models. These models fit population-averaged panel-data models. All models fit a log 
link function and an autoregressive correlation structure of one period, which assumes autocorrelation across 
periods within the same country. This is appropriate considering that previous periods are correlated in terms 
of ICOs. The use of a logarithmic link is appropriate for non-linear distributions such as those encountered in 
the ICO context. Models 1, 3 and 4 implement a negative binomial family. Model 2 implements a normal 
Gaussian family. Finally, we use robust standard errors. All variables are lagged by one period. *** p < 
0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 and † p < 0.10 (two tailed tests).
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Table 8. The effect of the ban on the ICO fundraising volume 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Domestic market cap (ln) 0.515** 0.489* 0.470* 0.400*
[0.198] [0.196] [0.195] [0.193]
Bitcoin price (ln) 0.772** 1.846*** 0.073 0.115
[0.246] [0.312] [0.495] [0.488]
Google trend 0.122*** 0.120*** 0.142*** 0.095***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.015]
GDP growth (w) 0.141 0.083 0.049 -0.029
[0.100] [0.100] [0.100] [0.099]
GDP per capita (ln) 0.343 0.525 0.002 1.963
[1.558] [1.543] [1.537] [1.545]
Inflation (w) -0.004 -0.007 -0.016 -0.006
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027]
Internet penetration 0.022 0.009 0.004 -0.013
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Google news (ln) -0.089 0.051 0.039 0.179
[0.123] [0.124] [0.123] [0.123]
Twitter activity (ln) 0.596*** 0.704*** 0.721*** 0.885***
[0.094] [0.095] [0.094] [0.096]
Google News sentiment 14.591*** 16.863*** 14.231*** 9.768*
[4.244] [4.224] [4.234] [4.232]
Twitter sentiment -1.540† -1.494† -1.402† -1.171
[0.855] [0.847] [0.842] [0.831]
Hacks in any country value (ln) -0.025 -0.043† -0.072** -0.058*
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
Protecting minority investors -0.040 -0.039 -0.060 -0.006
[0.052] [0.052] [0.052] [0.052]
Pre ban slope 0.675*** 0.588***
[0.147] [0.145]
China/South Korea ban -3.673*** -1.849* 0.185
[0.668] [0.773] [0.824]
Post ban slope -0.608***
[0.093]
Constant -9.712 -17.174 -2.068 -21.896
[14.358] [14.284] [14.564] [14.682]
Observations (Countries) 1615 (108) 1615 (108) 1615 (108) 1615 (108)
R-squared 0.278 0.292 0.302 0.322
All models fit a panel linear regression (xtreg). This is appropriate considering that the dependent 
variable is continuous and, after log transformation, normally distributed. We include country fixed 
effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. All variables are lagged by one period.              
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 and † p < 0.10 (two tailed tests).
